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.. '~ 
[Crim. No. 8690. In Bank. Dec. 15, 1965.] 
THE PEOPLE, Plaintift' and Respondent, v. JESSE JAMES ;~ 
GILBERT and ROBIN CHARLES KING, JR., D~" 
fendants and Appellants. ,(,. 
(1] 0riminaJ. Law-Evidence-Admissic:ins to Prosecuting 01II.eera. 
-Defendant's incriminating statements are inadmissible when., 
obtained in an investigation that was no longer a generalin';~~.; 
quiry into an unsolved crime but one focused on a particular;; 
suspect in custody by authorities who carried out a process o~,~:~ 
interrogation that lent itself to eliciting incriminating 8tat&-~· 
ments without first effectively infornling defendant of his: 
rights to counsel and to remain silent, and no evidence estah- 'c, . 
lishes defendant's waiver of those rights. .,! 
[1] See OalJur.M, Evidence, § 397; Am.Jar., Evidence (lat, 
ed §§ 600-602)./ 
Melt. Dig. References: [1, 2] Criminal Law, § 448; [3-6] Crim·; 
inal Law, § 1382(27); [7] Criminal Law, § 571; [8] Homicide, 
§ 267; [9] Criminal Law, § 1440(3); [10-13) Homicide, § 4; [14]. 
Conspiracy, §8(3); [15] Homicide, § 15(6); [16, 17, 191 Searches'''' 
and Seizures, § 29; [18] Arrest, § 15; [201 Criminal Law, § 545; , . 
[211 Witnesses, § 23j [22] Criminal Law, § 107; [23J Criminal ~,; 
Law, §104.5; [24) Robbery, § 23; [25] Criminal Law, § 536(1) ;;;" 
[26] Criminal Law, § 1382(23); [27] Criminal Law, § 1382(10);: 
[28] Criminal Law, § 52; [29) Criminal Law, § 782; [30] Kid.:j,,~ 
nap'pg. I§ 7.8; [31) Criminal Lo ... §lOlU; [32) J"'1. 1109(7). 'I 
\~ 
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[2] Id.-Evidence-Admissions to Prosecuting Officers.-Defend-
ant's statemcnts to investigating officers were admitted in vio-
lation of his rights to counsel and to remain silent where, at 
the time they were made, defendant was under arrest, had been 
in custody for four days, had bel'n intl'rrogated three times 
concprning a robhl'ry, waR formally chllrged with murder, roh-
bery and kidnaping, and was taken into an interrogation room 
for the purpose of eliciting incriminating statements without 
being advised of his rights to eounsel or to remain silent. 
[8] Id.-Appeal-lteversible Error-Evidence-Admissions. - De-
fendant's incriminating statemenb, obtained by authorities in 
violation of his rights to counsel and to remain silent and 
erroneously and prejudicially admitted into evidence were not 
merely cumulative of equally damaging admissible statements 
volunteered to the booking officer before defendant was for-
mally interrogated where there was evidence that defendant 
admitted guilty knowledge of his accomplices' plans to commit 
robbery only after prolonged interrogation and the booking 
officer did not testify to the details of the volunteered state-
ments but merely to the conclusions he drew from them. 
[4] Id.-Appeal-lteversible Error-Evidence-Admissions. - De-
fendant's trial testimony could not be segregated from his 
erroneously admitted and prejudicial statements, obtained by 
authorities in violation of his rights to counsel and to remain 
silent, to sustain a judgment of conviction where the detailed 
statements, including admissions of guilty knowledge, left him 
no choice but to attempt to exculpate himself by testifying 
that he did not know his codefendant and another intended 
robbery. 
[5] Id.-Appeal-Harmless Error-Evidence-Admissions.-Inad-
missible statements obtained from codefendant in violation of 
his rights to ('\ounsel and to remain silent and his testimony 
impelled by their use were not prejudicial to defendant, though 
the statements and testimony were to the effect that defendant 
planned a bank robbery culminating in murder, where eight 
witnesses present at the robbery unequivocally identified de-
fendant as one of the robbers and incriminating evidence was 
found in his apartment, including a drawing of the robbery 
area with writillg on it identified as defendant's. 
[6] Id.-Appeal-Harmless Error-Evidence-Admissions.-The 
erroneous admission into evidence of codefendant's statements, 
obtained in violation of his rights to counsel and to remain 
silent, and of his trial testimony identifying defendant as the 
perpetrator of a robbery CUlminating in murder was not preju-
dicial on the issue of defendant's death penalty for the murder 
of a police officer during the robbery where codefendant's 
st~tements and testimony were not reintroduced at the penalty 
tnal, the prosecutor did not comment on them, and in nggrava-
\ 
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tion of the penalty, the prosecutor showed defendant's eden- .. 
sive criminal record involving a series of armed bank rob-\ 
beries, as well as the circumstances of the officer's death. . 
[7J Id.-Evidence-Accomplices and Corroboration.-Although,in ; 
a joint trial of defendant and an accomplice, the prosecution 
may not call the accomplice as a witness, an accomplice choos-
ing to take the stand need not limit his testimony to himself; 
accomplices are competent to testify for or against each other, 
whether they are tried jointly or severally. (Pen. Code, 
§§ 1321, 1323.5; Code Civ. Proc., § 1879.) 
.[8] Homicide-Appeal-Reversible Error-Instructions. - An in-
struction that defendants could be convicted of murder for the 
killing of their accomplice during a robbery without proof of 
malice and solely on the ground that they committed the rob-
bery which was the proximate cause of their accomplice's death 
withdrew from the jury the crucial issue of whether the shoot-
ing of the accomplice was in response to the shooting of an 
officer or solely to prevent the robbery, and denial of defend-
ants' constitutional right to have the jury determine every 
material issue presented by the evidence was a miscarriage of 
justice within the meaning of Const., art. VI, § 41;'2. 
[9] Criminal Law-Appeal-Harmless Error-Procedure for De-
termining Penalty.-Regardless of what conclusion a properly 
instructed jury might reach on defendant's liability for the 
death of his accomplice in a bank robbery, where that death 
was a circumstance of the murder of an officer at the robbery 
scene, the jury could properly consider in aggravation of the 
penalty for the officer's murder the accomplice's death (Pen. 
Code, § 190.1), and error in instructing that defendant could 
be convicted of murder for the killing of his accomplice with-
out proof of malice, solely on the ground that the robbery was 
the proximate cause of the accomplice's death was not preju-
dicial to defendant on the issue of the penalty for the officer's 
murder. 
[10] Homicide-Participation in Oifense Resulting in Homicide.-
To convict defendant of first degree murder for a killing com-
mitted by another, the following principle may be invoked: 
Murder is the unlawful killing of a human being with malice 
aforethought (Pen. Code, § 187), and such malice is implied 
under § 1i8 when defendant or his accomplice for a base, anti-
social motive and with wanton disregard for human life, does 
an act involving a high degrfle of probability that it will result 
in death. Initiating a gun battle is such an act. 
[1l] ld.-Participation in Oifense Resulting in Homicide.-For de-
fendant to be convicted of first degree murder for a killing 
[10] See Cal.Jur.2d, Homicide, §§ 15-21; Am.Jm., Homicide 
(let ed § 56). 
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committed by another, the killing must be attributable to the 
act of defendant or his accomplice. 
{12] Id.-Participation in Offense Resulting in lIomicide.-When 
defendant or his accomplice, with a conscious disregu:d for 
life, intentionally commits an act likely to cause death; and 
his victim or a police officer kills in reasonable response to 
the act, defendant is guilty of murder, and the killing is 
attributable, not merely to the commission of a felony., but 
to the intentional act of defendant or his accomplice COlll-
mitted with conscious disregard of life. 
[18] Id.-Participation in 01fense Resulting in lIomicide.-A po-
lice officer's killing of anoth-er in the performance of his duty 
cannot be considered an independent intervening cause for 
which defendant is not liable where the killing is a reasonable 
response to the dilemma thrust on the policeman by the inten-
tional act of defendant or his accomplice. 
[14] Conspiracy-Criminal-Liability of Coconspirators-Acts in 
Furtherance of Common Design. - Under the rules defining 
principals in criminal conspiracies, defendant may be guilty 
of murder for a killing attributable to his accomplice's act; 
but to be so guilty, the accomplice must cause the death of 
another human being by an act committed in furtherance of 
the common design. 
[15] Homicide-First Degree Murder-Killing in Perpetration of 
Felony.-When murder is established under Pen. Code, §§ 187 
and 188, § 189 may properly be invoked to determine the de-
gree of that murder. Thus, though malice aforethought may 
not be implied under § 189 to make a killing murder unless 
defendant or his accomplice commits the killing in perpetra-
tion of an inherently dangerous felony, when murder is other-
wise established, § 189 may be invoked to determine its degree. 
[16] Searches and Seizures - Incidental to Arrest - Search of' 
Premises.-In a prosecution of codefendants for a bank rob-
bery and the murder of an accomplice and a police officer, 
though officers who were pursuing defendant entered his 
apltrtment without a warrant, the trial court properly admitted 
in evidence articles found therein that connected defendant 
with the robbery where the complicity of defendant and his 
address were learned from the dying accomplice and offi('ers 
found the apartment unoccupied on their arrival. 
[17] Id. - Incidental to Arrest - Search of Premises. - A search 
without a warrant is reasonable when officers enter in fresh 
pursuit of escaping felons to make an arrest. 
[18] Arrest-Making Arrest-Making Known Official Character-
Fresh Pursuit.-Wh!'re officers entered defendant's apartment, 
[14] See Cal.Jur.2d, Conspiracy, §§ 8-10; Am.Jur.2d, Conspir-
acy, §14. 
I 
I 
\ 
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after a bank robbery and killing of a policeman, not to make 
1\ general exploratory search to find evidence of guilt, but in 
fresh puriluit to search for a suspect reasonably believed to 
be in the apartment and to arrest him, the officers were not 
required to demand entrance and announce their purpose (Pen. 
Code, § 844) and thus increase their peril by possibly alerting 
the suspect. 
[19] Searches and Seizures-Incident to Arrest-Search of Prem-
ises.-While officers looked through defendant's apartment for 
a suspected robber and murderer reasonably believed to be 
there, they could properly examine suspicious objects in plain 
sight and could properly look for anything that could be used 
to identify defendant or his accomplices or to expedite their 
pursuit of defendant; thus, evidence obtained through the 
search was properly admitted. 
(20] Criminal Law - Evidence - Demonstrative Evidence - Writ-
ings for Comparison.-Defendant waived any rights he nlight 
have had as to use of his handwriting exemplars where they 
were made voluntarily after he was advised that he was not 
required to say anything without advice of counsel and that 
any statements he made might be used against him. 
[21] Witnesses-Duty to Testify-Self-incrimination-ldenti1ica-
tion of Accused.-The privilege against self-incrimination does 
not exempt an accused from appearing for identification and 
no substantial right is infringed by a police show-up. 
[22] Criminal Law-Rights of Accused-Aid of Counsel.-Though 
requiring defendant to appear at a police show-up after his 
indictment cannot be considered a mere investigation, defend-
ant is not prejudiced by the absence of counsel so long as the 
show-up is not designed to elicit information from defendant 
or impair his privilege ngainst self-incrimination. 
[23] ld.-Rights of Accused-Rights of Discovery.-Defense coun-
sel can effectively obtain information as to whether police 
show-up proceedings were fairly conducted by pretrial dis-
covery of prosecution witnesses and by cross-examination on 
the issue of procedt:re employed at the show-up. 
[24] Robbery-Evidence-Demonstrative Evidence.-In a prosecu-
tion for armed robbery, a weapon found in defendant's posses-
sion whc>n arrested but not identified as the one used in the 
robbery c(,uld properly be admitted only on the issue of the 
minimum penalty. (Pen. Code, §§ 3024, 969c, 1158a.) 
[25] CrimfJl.al Law-Evidence-Demonstrative Evidence-Weap-
ons.-Though when defendant is charged under Pen. Code, 
§ 969c, with having been armed at arrest and pleads not guilty, 
the jury must determine' whE'thl'T he was armed (Pen. Code, 
§ 1158a) , whE'n 11E' stipullltl's to bllving been armed at arrest 
for the purpose of thc penlilty, no purpose is servE'd by ad~ 
lllitting evidenee tbllt be was armed (Pen. Codl', § 1025). 
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[26] Id.-Appeal- Harmless Error - Evidence - Demonstrative 
Evidence.-Evidenee that a weapon was found in defendant's 
possession at the time of his arrest tends to show, not that he 
committed armed robbery, but only that he is the sort of person 
who carries deadly weapons, and where, in a prosecution for 
armed robbery, defendant stipulated to being armed at arre!'t 
with a weapon not used in the robbery, the error in admitting 
testimony that he was anll£'n at arrest was not prejudicial. 
(Const., art. VI, § 4%.) 
[27J Id.-Appeal-Harmless Error-Evidence-Facts Otherwise 
Shown.-Defendant wa!'l not prejudic£'d by evidence that he 
was arrested in Philad£'Jphia (as b£'ing too remote to indicate 
flight) where th£'re was morc cog£'nt evidence of his flight. 
[28] Id.-Defenses-Alibi.-An alibi consists of evidence that de-
fendant was not at the scene of the alleged crime when it was 
committed and that he did not otherwise participate in itt; 
commission. 
[29] Id.-Instructions-Alibi.-In the prosecution for robbery of 
a bank, though there was evidence that the bank was about 
45 minutes driving time from defendant's apartment, the 
apartment manager's admission, on cross-examination, that her 
testimony of defendant's asking her for a key more than all 
hour after the robbery varied somewhat from her pretrial 
statement that defendant might have asked for a key 15 
minutes after the robbery merely east doubt on the accuracy 
of her testimony and absent evidence of defendant's being 
at a place other than the robbery scene at the time of the 
robbery, the trial court. properly refused an alibi instruction. 
[30] Kidnaping - Evidence: Instructions. - In a prosecution for 
kidnaping for the purpose of robbery, testimony of the victim 
that defendant's grip on her ann was so finn she felt the 
illlpression for some time, that she was pushed toward the 
door, and that she fell on the sidewalk but was not sure 
whether she was pushed down, was not sufficient to show 
bodily harm within the meaning of Pen. Code, § 209, and the 
trial court did not err in refusing defendant's requested in-
struction on bodily hann. 
[31] Oriminal Law-Procedure for Determining Penalty.-In pro-
viding under Pen. Code, § 190.1, for a separate penalty trial 
for offenses punished by death or life imprisonment, the 
Legislature expressed a preference for one jury qualified to 
act throughout the entire case, and this preference does not 
deprive defendant of due process or the right of an impartial 
jury, since .evidence properly introduced at the trial on the 
guilt issue is relevant to determining the penalty. 
[32] Jury-Challenges-For Cau¥-Questions as to Death Pen-
alty.-To exclude jurors opposed to the deat.h penalty does not 
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favor the prosecution over defendant; defendant has the right ,,-:111 
to challenge for cause jurors biased in favor of the death:~ 
penalty, even though they state they are able to render an ,,* 
impartial verdict. 
APPEALS ',(one automatically taken under Pen. Code, 
§ 1239, subd. (b» from judgments of the Superior Court of 
Los Angeles County. H. Burton Noble, Judge. Judgments 
as to one defendant reversed; judgment'> as to other defend-
ant, reversed in part and affirmed in part. ' , 
Prosecution for murders of defendants' accomplice and of 
a police officer, for robbery and for kidnaping for the purpose 
of robbery. Judgments of conviction of one defendant re-
versed; judgments of conviction of other defendant reversed 
as to first degree murder of accomplice and affirmed in all 
other respects. 
Hugh R. Manes, under appointment by the Supreme Court, 
and Erling J. Hovden, Public Defender (Los Angeles), .1. 
Stanley Brill and James L. McCormick, Deputy Public De-
fenders, for Defendants and Appellants. 
Thomas C. Lynch, Attorney General, William E. James, 
Assistant Attorney General, and Norman H. Sokolow, Deputy 
Attorney General, for Plaintiff and Respondent. 
TRAYNOR, C. J.-Defendants were convicted on two 
counts of :first degree murder (Pen. Code, §§ 187, 189), one 
count of :first degree robbery (Pen. Code, §§ 211, 211a), and 
four counts of kidnaping for the purpose of robbery (Pen. 
Code, § 209). On each count of :first degree murder, defend-
ant King's penalty was fixed at life imprisonment and de-
fendant Gilbert's penalty was :fixed at death. (Pen. Code, 
§§ 190, 190.1.) The trial court sentenced King to prison for 
the term prescribed by law on all counts and sentenced Gil-
bert to death on the two murder counts and to prison on the 
remaining counts for the term prescribed by law. King ap-
peals from the judgment of conviction. Gilbert's appeal is 
automatic. (Pen. Code, § 1239, subd. (b).) 
ShortlY after 10 :30 a.m., January 3, 1964, defendant Gil-
bert and Edgar Ball Weaver entered an Alhambra savings 
and loan association office, hereafter referred to as a bank, 
wearing hats and sunglasses. Gilbert, armed with an auto-
matic pistol, shouted, "Everybody freeze; this is a hold-
Dec. 1965] PEoPLE 1I.GILBEBT 
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up. " He threw a paper shopping bag with the name Alpha 
Beta on it at one of the tellers and told her to rul it with 
money. Weaver, armed with a revolver, stood by the door and 
kept the bank covered while Gilbert forced an accountant to 
open the vault and directed the senior teller and the control-
ler to open compartments inside. After obtaining only a box 
of rolled coins from the vault, Gilbert retrieved the shopping 
bag and began to rul it with money from the tellers' 
drawers. 
Alhambra Police Officer George Davis, who had been 
alerted to the robbery, entered the bank with a shotgun and 
disarmed Weaver. Gilbert then grabbed a woman teller and 
pushed her toward the door, pointing his pistol at her head 
and warning Davis: "Drop that gun and back off or 1'11 
shoot the woman." Davis backed toward the front door, 
saying, "No you won't; you will never shoot." Officer Billy 
Edward Nixon then arrived at the bank in a police car and 
saw Officer Davis backing out of the front door with a shot-
gun. As Gilbert followed Davis out of the bank, he pushed 
the woman toward Davis and fired, mortally wounding Davis. 
Weaver picked up his revolver and followed Gilbert out of 
the bank. As they :fled, Officer Nixon shot and wounded 
Weaver. 
Gilbert and Weaver escaped in a white automobile. A wit-
ness gave the license number to Officer Nixon, and several 
bystanders directed him as he pursued the automobile. 
Several blocks from the bank a man ran up to Officer Nixon 
and told him that two men who seemed to be trying to get" 
away from something left a white automobile and entered 
another white automobile and continued north on Granada. 
Officer Nixon found an unoccupied white automobile with the 
license number that had been given to him parked facing 
north on Granada. Farther north on the same street he saw a 
green automobile that had run over the curb and crashed into 
a tree. Weaver was inside, semiconscious and bleeding, with a 
revolver on the seat beside him. Weaver died in the hospital 
later that evening from a bullet that had entered his back. 
Law enforcement officers questioned defendant King about 
the robbery' twice on January 5, two days after the robbery, 
and again on January 10, when he came to the Alhambra 
police station pursuant to la request. On each occasion he 
denied knowledge of the robbery. The San Gabriel police 
arrested him on February 7, and on February 11 took him to 
the Alhambra police station. Upon being told that he was 
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being booked on charges of murder, robbery, and kidnaping;~~ 
King became very talkative and began to disclose his partici- ' 
pation in the robbery. A police officer told him to wait until 
booking had been concluded before making any statements: 
He was taken into an interrogation room and during a seven-
hour session gave detailed statements about his participation 
in the robbery. 
King told the officers that he met Weaver at a parole meet-
ing. Although he refused to help Weaver rob a "bookie 
joint, " he later accepted Weaver's offer of $100 to steal an 
automobile. On the morning of January 3, 1964, King stole a 
white automobile and drove it to Los Feliz and San Fer- i 
nando Road. A friend followed in King's own white auto-
mobile. Gilbert and Weaver arrived in a green automobile at 
10 a.m., and King and llis friend followed them to Alhambra. 
Gilbert and Weaver parked the green automobile and took 
the stolen automobile. For $1,000 King agreed to wait for 
them and to drIve Gilbert back to Glendale. 
After leaving his friend at a bowling alley, King waited 
for Gilbert and 'Veaver. When they returned, Weaver, who 
was bleeding badly, got into the green automobile, and Gil-
bert got into King's automobile with a shopping bag. Gilbert 
put a .45 automatic pistol against King's stomach and 
threatened to kill him unless he did what he was told. 
King drove to Gilbert's apartment in Glendale. On the 
way, Gilbert told King that he and Weaver had robbed a 
bank. He said that when a policeman entered the bank he 
used a woman as a hostage and forced the policeman to back 
out the door. He shot the policeman and fired two shots at 
another officer who was sitting in a police car. Gilbert said, 
"I have killed one cop today, and I will kill a lot more before 
I am through." He also said that he thought that Weaver 
got in his line of fire and that he had accidentally shot 
Weaver. 
When they arrived at Gilbert's apartment, King waited 
with the shopping bag while Gilbert obtained a key from the 
manager. After Gilbert changed clothing, he offered King 
$1,000 to drive him to Salt Lake City. When King refused, 
Gilbert C{l-me toward him holding a pillow. King heard a clicIt 
and realized that a pistol under the pillow had misfired. He 
begged for his life, and, after a few moments, Gilbert said 
that he was not going to kill him. Gilbert gave King $1,300, 
and they left the apartment. King waited while Gilbert re-
turned the key to the manager. They drove to an alley where 
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Gilbert threw his .45 automatic pistol into a garbage can. 
They went to a bar, and, shortly after Gilbert met a woman 
friend, he allowed King to leave. 
King's statements were admitted into evidence at the trial 
on the issue of guilt. He contends that they were erroneously 
admitted over his objection. 
[1] Incriminating statements are inadmissible if they 
were obtained when" (1) the investigation was no longer a 
general inquiry into an unsolved crime but had begun to 
focus on a particular suspect, (2) the suspect was in custody, 
(3) the authorities had carried out a process of interroga-
tions that lent itself to eliciting incriminating statements, 
(4) the authorities had not eiiectively informed defendant of 
his right to counselor of his right to remain silent, and no 
evidence establishes that he waived those rights." (People v. 
Dorado, 62 Ca1.2d 338, 353-354 [42 Ca1.Rptr. 169, 398 P.2d 
361) ; Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478 [84 S.01. 1758, 12 
L.Ed.2d 977].) . 
[2] King's statements were admitted in violation of this 
rule. When King made them he was in custody and the inves-
tigation was no longer a general inquiry into an unsolved 
crime but had focused upon him. When the police took him 
into the interrogation room shortly after 3 p.m. on February 
11, their purpose was to elicit incriminating statements. A 
short time after the interview began a tape recorder was 
started without King's knowledge. At 10 p.m. King was 
asked to make a formal tape recording for use in court. When 
he refused to do 80 he was asked to dictate a statement to be 
used in court. King said that he would make a statement, but 
that he would not sign it until he had advice from an at-
torney. At no time was he advised of his right to counselor 
of his right to remain silent. l Accordingly, the statements 
should have been excluded. 
IOn lImr dire examination, King testi1led that after he waa told of 
the charges against him he asked for an attorney and that he made his 
statements only after his request was refused. Ria testimony was eon· 
troverted, however, b,. the testimon,. of an A1hambra poliee o1licer who 
said that King did not ask for an attorney before making hia state· 
• ments. The'trial eourt found that King made his statements without 
requesting counsel, and, interpreting E.co'beao v. IlliftOiB, 378 U.S. 478, 
[84 B.Ct. 1758, 12 L.Ed.2d 977], to require a request for eounsel (see 
People v. Dorado, 62 Cal.2d 388, 347-351 [42 Cal.Rptr. 169, 398 P.2d 
361J), admitted his statements. On the other hand, the eourt excluded 
a statement obtained from Gilbert on the ground that he requested 
counsel and was denied counsel. Gilbert, who knew of his rights, said 
during his interrogation, "1 want an attorne,. present during all my 
answers. I know anything I 8&7 is going to be held against me." 
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The Attorney General contends, however, that King's 
statements were not obtained by a process of interrogationsi 
that lent itself to eliciting incriminating statements since' 
King began voluntarily to disclose his participation in the, 
robbery before he was asked any questions and before he was 
taken into the interrogation room. We do not agree with this 
contention. The statements that were introduced at the trial 
were not spontaneous, unsolicited declarations but detailed 
statements obtained through a period of prolonged interroga-
tion. 
In People v. Stewart, 62 Ca1.2d 571, 578 [43 Cal.Rptr.201, 
400 P.2d 97], we pointed out that in most cases an interroga-
tion following an arrest will lend itself to eliciting incrimi-
nating statements. (See also People v. Bilderback, 62 Cal.2d ' 
757,761-762 [44 Cal.Rptr. 313, 401 P.2d 921J.) When King 
made his statements he was not only under arrest but had 
been in custody for four days. He had been interrogated 
three times previously concerning the robbery. When the 
police formally charged him with murder, robbery and kid-
naping, the accusatory stage had been reached. When they 
took him into the interrogation room, their purpose was to 
elicit incriminating statements, and they had a duty to 
advise him of his constitutional rights. 
In People v. Cotter, ante, pp. 386, 393, 398 [46 Cal. 
Rptr. 622, 405 P.2d 862J, and People v. Jacobson, ante, pp. 
319, 329, 331 [46 Cal.Rptr. 515, 405 P.2d 555], we held 
that the fact that a defendant is willing to confess and has 
already volunteered incriminating statements and confessions 
does not absolve the police of the duty to advise him of his 
constitutional rights before eliciting further confessions at 
stationhouse interrogations. We further held, however, that 
error in admitting confessions so elicited in the absence of 
such warning is not prejudicial when there are also in evi-
dence equally damaging admissible confessions that were 
made before the police improperly elicited the inadmissible 
confessions. 
[3] In the present case, however, the booking officer did 
not testify to the details of what King volunteered before he 
was formally interrogated. The officer stated only the conclu-
sions he drew therefrom. There is nothing in the record to 
indicate that King's volunteered statements during booking 
were not wholly consistent with his testimony at the trial 
that he had no knowledge of the planned robbery until after 
it occurred. There is evidence, however, that King admitted 
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guilty knowledge of the plans of Weaver and Gilbert only 
after prolonged interrogation. Thus, King's inadmissible 
statements were not merely cumulative of equally damaging 
admissible statements. 
[4] There is also no merit in the contention that the erro-
neous admission of King's statements was not prejudicial to 
llim because he took the stand and testified to committing the 
same acts that he had admitted in his statements. When King 
testified, the only evidence other than his statements that had 
been introduced to connect him with the crime was a finger-
print identified as his on a shopping bag similar to the one 
tllat had been used in the robbery. Since the details of his 
,'olunteered statements during booking are not in evidence, it 
is impossible to determine whether detailed evidence of those 
statements alone would have impelled his testimony. The de-
tailed inadmissible statements, including admissions of guilty 
knowledge, clearly left King no choice but to take the stand 
and attempt to exculpate himself by testifying that he did 
not know that Gilbert and Weaver intended to commit a 
robbery. Thus, King's testimony cannot be segregated from 
his erroneously admitted statements to sustain the judgment. 
(Fahy v. Connecticut, 375 U.S. 85, 91 (84 S.Ct.229, 11 
L.Ed.2d 171] ; People v. Davis, 62 Ca1.2d 791, 796 [44 Cal. 
Rptr. 454, 402 P.2d 142]; People v. Ibarra, 60 Ca1.2d 460, 
463 [34 Cal.Rptr. 863, 386 P.2d 487]; People v. Dixon, 46 
Ca1.2d 456, 458 [296 P.2d 557].) Accordingly, the judgment 
convicting King must be reversed. 
Defendant Gilbert contends that since King's statements· 
and testimony implicated him, the error was also prejudicial 
as to him, thereby compelling reversal. In People v. Aranda, 
ante, pp. 518, 526 [47 Cal.Rptr. 353, 407 P.2d 265], we 
held that instructions that an erroneously admitted confes-
sion of one defendant implicating his codefendant should be 
considered against the former only did not cure the error as 
to the latter. We pointed out that "The giving of such in-
structions, however, and the fact that the confession is only 
an accusation against the nondeclarant and thus lacks the 
shattering impact of a self-incriminatory statement by him 
(see People v. Parham, 60 Ca1.2d 378, 385 [33 Cal.Rptr. 497, 
384 P.2d lQOl]) preclude holding that the error of admitting 
the confession is always prejudicial to the nondeclarant." 
This rule also applies to King's testimony that was impelled 
by the err4>neous admission of his statements. 
CJ 
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[6] The dect of King's statements as an accusation', 
, against Gilbert was somewhat vitiated by the trial court's '; 
instruction that the jury should not consider them as evi. .I 
dence against Gilbert. King's testimony was' less damaging 
to Gilbert than his statements, and the trial court instructed 
the jury that such testimony' must be corroborated and 
should be viewed with distrust. Regardless of the efficacy of 
these instructions, King's statements and testimony cannot 
be considered prejudicial in face of the overwhelming evi-
dence of Gilbert's guilt. Eight witnesses who were present in 
the bank unequivocally identified Gilbert as one of the rob-
bers, and incriminating evidence was found in his apartment, 
including a drawing of the Alhambra bank area with writing 
on it identi1ied as Gilbert's. Under these circumstances, there 
is no reasonable possibility that the error in admitting 
King's statements and testimony might have contributed to 
Gilbert's conviction. (Cal. Const., art. VI, § 41;2; Faky v. 
Connecticut, 375 U.S. 85, 86-87 [84 S.Ct. 229, 11 L.Ed.2d 
171]; People v. 'Watson, 46 Cal.2d 818, 836 [299 P.2d 
243].) 
[6] Nor was the admission of King's statements and 
testimony at the trial on the issue of guilt prejudicial on the 
issue of Gilbert's penalty. At the trial on the issue of penalty 
King's statements were not reintroduced, King did not 
testify, and the district attorney did not comment upon his 
statements or testimony in arguing to the jury. Most of the 
prosecution's evidence at the penalty trial was introduced to 
sho,v facts in aggravation of. Gilbert's penalty. Gilbert was 
convicted in 1947 of second degree murder upon a plea of 
guilty for killing a fellow prisoner while serving a term in 
San Quentin. He was released on parole in 1959, and con-
victed of burglary in 1960. He escaped from prison in July 
1963, and committed a series of armed bank robberies on 
October 28, December 6, December 20, December 23, and De-
cember 31, 1963.2 In the face of such facts in aggravation of 
the penalty and of the circumstances of the killing of Officer 
Davis, the erroneous admission of King's statements at the 
trial on thl! issue of guilt was not prejudicial on the question 
of Gilbert's penalty. (Cal. Const., art. VI, § 4%; Faky v. 
Connecticut, 375 U.S. 85, 186·87 [84 S.Ct. 229, 11 L.Ed.2d 
2The trial court instructed the jury to di~regard tllese erimes 1DIlesa 
it believed beyond a reasonable doubt that tIll! evidenec est.ablished that 
Gllbert was guilty of eommitting them. (8('e People v. TefT1/, 61 Cal.2d 
137, 149, In. 8 [87 Ca1.Rptr. 605, 390 P.2d 881].) 
) 
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17l); Peop7e v. Watson l 46 Cal.2d 818, 836 [299 P.2d 
243].) 
Gilbert also contends that the trial court erroneously re-
fused to instruct the jury to disregard King's testimony as 
evidence against him, on the ground that such testimony was 
not part of the People's evidence and was introduced after 
he rested his case. The contcntion is frivolous that the cor-
roborated testimony of 8n accomplice cannot be considered as 
evidence against a defendant W]lO is tried separately. (Pen. 
Code, § 1111.) Likewise a defendant has no ground to object 
to his accomplice's testimony because Jle is tried jointly. 
[7] It is true that when the accomplice is also on trial, the 
prosecution may not call him as a witness. (Pen. Code, 
§ 1323.5.) It does not follow, however, that if he chooses to 
take the stand his testimony is limited to himself, for accom-
plices are competent to testify for or against each other, 
whether they are tried jointly or severally. (Pen. Code, 
§§ 1321, 1323.5; Code Civ. Proc., § 1879.)8 
BQth defendants contend that since their accomplice was 
killed by a police officer, the felony-murder doctrine cannot be 
invoked to convict them of first degree murder for tllat killing. 
(Count II.) In People v. Washington, 62 Ca1.2d 777, 781-782 
[44 Cal. Rptr. 442,402 P.2d 130], we he]d that since the purpose 
of the common-law felony-murder rule is to deter felons from 
killing negligently or accidentally by holding them strictly 
responsible for killings they commit, malice aforethought 
cannot be imputed under that rule unless a felon commits the 
Jdlling. We recognized, however, that entirely apart from the 
felony-murder rule, malice may be established when a de-
fendant initiates a gun battle, and that under such circum-
stances he may be convicted of murder for a killing 
committed by another. [8] Although the evidence in the 
present case would support a conviction of first degree mur-
der on the ground that Weaver was killed in response to a 
shooting initiated by Gilbert, the court did not instruct the 
jury on that ground, but gave an erroneous instruction that 
defendants could be convicted of murder for that killing 
SA defendant who can abow prejudice from being tried jointly with 
others, however, may move for a severance under Penal Code, section 
1098. (Cf. People v. Clark, 62 Ca1.2d 870, 883-885 [44 CaJ.Rptr. 784, 
402 P.2d 856); People v . ..{ra1ld4l, ante, pp. 518, 529 [47 Cal.Rptr. 
353, 407 P.2d 265).) Although each defendant has the benefit of n pre-
sumption of innocence and a privilege against self-incriminat.ion, due 
process of law does not require that the prosecution rely solely upon 
its own proof in establiahing its case. 
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wit1lOut proof of malice and solely on the ground that they 
committed a robbery that was the proximate cause of their;, 
accomplice's death. This instruction withdrew from the jury,i 
the crucial issue of whether the shooting of Weaver was in· 
response to the shooting of Davis or solely to prevent the 
robbery. Since defendants have a constitutional right to have· 
the jury determine every material issue presented by the evi-. 
dellce, the denial of that right was a miscarriage of justice 
within the meaning of article VI, section 4% of the Cali-
fornia Constitution. (People v. Modesto, 59 Ca1.2d 722, 730 
[31 Cal.Rptr. 225, 382 P.2d 33], and eases cited.) 
[9] Regardless of the conclusion that the jury, properly 
instructed, might have reached on Gilbert's liability for the 
death of his accomplice, that death was a circumstance of the· 
murder of Officer Davis that the jury could properly consider . 
in aggravation of the penalty for that murder. (Pen. Code, ~ 
§ 190.1.) Thus, the error was not prejudicial to Gilbert on the 
issue of the penalty for Davis' murder. Accordingly, he is 
not entitled to a new penalty trial as to that count. 
Since the application of the principles of criminal liability 
for a killing committed by another may arise upon King's 
retrial, it is appropriate here to define that liability. [10] The I" 
following principles may be invoked. to convict a defend- .... 
:!t:;r :1irst degree murder for a killing committed by": 
(1) Proof of malice aforethought. "Murder is the unlaw-
ful killing of a human being, with malice aforethought."1 
(Pen. Code, § 187.) Such malice is implied under Penal Code .. 1 
section 188 when the defendant or his accomplice " • for a 1 
base, antisocial motive and with wanton disregard for human j 
life, does an act that involves a high degree of probability 1 
that it will result in death.'" (People v. Washington, 62 
Ca1.2d 777, 782 [44 Cal.Rptr. 442, 402 P.2d 130], quoting .• ~ 
PeopZe v. Thomas, 41 Ca1.2d 470, 480 [261 P.2d 1] [concur-' '~4 ring opinion].) Initiating a gun battle is such an act. 
[11] (2) The killing m1lst be attributable to the act of 
the defendant or his accomplice. [12] When the defendant 
or his accomplice, with a conscious. disregard for life, inten-
tionally commits an act that is likely to cause death, and his 
victim or a police officer kills iin reasonable response to such 
act, the defendant is guilty of murder. In such a case, the 
killing is attributable, not merely to the commission of a 
felony, but to the intentional act of the defendant or his 
'. accomplice committed with conscious disregard for life. 
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[18] Thus, the victim's self-defensive killing or the police 
officer's killing in the performance of his duty cannot be 
considered an independent intervening cause for which the 
defendant is not liable, for it is a reasonable response to the 
dilemma thrust upon the victim or the policeman by the in-
tentional act of the defendant or his accomplice. (See Hart 
and Honore, Causation in the Law, pp. 296-299; Hall, Gen-
eral Principles of Criminal Law (2d ed.) pp. 270-281.) 
[14] (3) Vicarious criminal liability. Under the rules de-
fining principals and criminal conspiracies, the defendant 
may be guilty of murder for a killing attributable to the act 
of his accomplice. To be so guilty, however, the accomplice 
must cause the death of another human being by an act com-
mitted in furtherance of the common design. (People v. 
Schader,62 Ca1.2d 716,731 [44 Ca1.Rptr. 193, 401 P.2d 665] ; 
People v. Boss, 210 Cal. 245, 249 [290 P. 881]; People v. 
Ferlin, 203 Cal. 587, 597 [265 P. 230].) 
(4) Tlte application of Penal Code section 189. [15] When 
murder is established under Penal Code sections 187 and 
188 pursuant to the principles defined above, section 189 
may properly be invoked to determine the degree of that 
murder. Thus, even though malice aforethought may not be 
implied under section 189 to make a killing murder unless 
the defendant or his accomplice commits the killing in the 
perpetration of an inherently dangerous felony (People v. 
Washington, 62 Cal.2d 777, 780-783 [44 Cal. Rptr. 442, 402 
P.2d 130J ; People v. Ford, 60 Ca1.2d 772, 795 [36 Cal.Rptr. 
620, 388 P.2d 892]), when a murder is otherwise established, . 
section 189 may be invoked to determine its degree. 
[16] Defendants contend that the trial court erred in ad-
mitting evidence illegally obtained by a search of Gilbert's 
apartment. At a hearing outside the presence of the jury the 
prosecution introduced evidence of the following facts : 
Weaver was taken to the hospital shortly after Officer 
Nixon found him in the crashed automobile. At the hospital 
he told an F.B.I. agent' that he committed the robbery with 
a man named Gilbert who lived in apartment 28 of a certain 
apartment h\luse on Los Feliz Boulevard in Glendale. Pursu-
ant to a broadcast of this information, agent Kiel located the 
apartment house at 1 p.m. When he arrived he saw a man 
talking to the manager. After'the man left, Kiel talked to the 
'It ill a violation of U.S. Code, title 18. section 2113. to rob a sav-
ings and loan aBBociation whose accounts are insured by the federal 
lovernment. 
83 C.Jd-D 
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manager, who told him that Mr. Flood, one of the two men 
who rented apartment 28 the previous day, had left just as 
he arrived. Kiel relayed this information to agent Schlatter 
and several other officers when they arrived 10 minutes later. 
Schlatter obtained a key from the manager and the officers 
entered the apartment. They found it unoccupied. On the 
coffee table Schlatter noticed a notebook with a drawing of 
the area of the Alhambra bank. Inside an Alpha Beta shop-
ping bag he found some rolls of coins bearing the name of the 
bank. He found an ammunition clip from a .45 caliber auto-
matic pistol, and another agent found on top of a bedroom 
dresser an envelope from a photography studio with a photo-
graph of Gilbert inside. The photograpb was shown to bank 
employees for identification. 
Even though the officers entered Gilbert's apartment with-
out a warrant;1 the trial court properly admitted into evi-
dence the articles found in the apartment and testimony by 
iingerprint experts wbo found fingerprints of Gilbert and 
'Weaver in the apartment and King's fingerprint on the 
shopping bag. A search without a warrant is reasonable when 
it is incident to a lawful arrest (Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 
23 [83 8.0t. 1623, 10 L.Ed.2d 726] ; Harris v. United States, 
331 U.S. 145 [67 S.Ct. 1098, 91 L.Ed. 1399]; People v. 
Boyles, 45 Oa1.2d 652 [290 P.2d 535]),· or is justified by a 
pressing emergency (People v. Roberts, 47 Oal.2d 374, 377-
378 [303 P.2d 721] ; see McDonald v. United States, 335 U.S. 
451, 454 [69 8.0t. 191, 93 L.Ed. 153]). [17] It is also 
reasonable when the officers enter in fresh pursuit of escap-
ing felons to make an arrest. 
[18] The officers identified Gilbert and found out where 
he lived less than two hours after the robbery. En route to 
Gilbert's apartment, agent Schlatter heard over the radio 
that three men were suspected of committing· the robbery and 
liThe officers later obtained warrants to seize the articles found in the 
apartment. 
6A search cannot be justified as incident to an arrest unless it is 
substantially contemporaneous with the arrest and confined to the im· 
mediate ncWty of the arrest. (.Agnello v. United State" 269 U.S. 20 
[46 s.et. 4, 70 L.Ed. 145, 51 A.L.R. 409]; People v. Cf"W!, 61 Cal.2d 
861, 865-866 [40 Cal.Rptr. 841, 395 P.2d 889]; Castaneda v. Superior 
Court, 59 Cal.2d 439, 442 [30 Ca'I.Rytr. 1, 380 P.2d 641]; Tompkins v. 
Superior Court, 59 Cal.2d 65. 67 l27 Cal.Rptr. 889, 378 P.2d 113]; 
People v. Gorg, 45 Cal.2d 776, 781 [291 P.2d 469].) Therefore, probable 
cause to arrest Gilbert is not alone sufficient to justify a search of his 
apartment. (See Stoner v. California, 376 U.S. 483, 486·487 [84 S.Ct. 
• 889, 11 L.Ed.2d 856].) 
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that two of them had escaped in the same automohile. When 
Schlatter arrived at the apartment, agent Kiel told him that 
one of the occupants had just left. Schlatter testified that 
"we knew ... there were three robbers. One was ''I'ounded 
and accounted for, one had just left a few minutes before, 
and there was a third unaccounted for. Presumably he was in 
the apartment." Since the officers were in fresh pursuit of 
two robbers who escaped in the same automobile, agent 
Schlatter's assumption was not unreasonable. The officers 
entered, not to make a general exploratory search to find 
evidence of guilt, but in fresh pursuit to search for a suspect 
and make an arrest. A police officer had been shot, one sus-
pect was escaping, and another suspect was likely to escape. 
Under these circumstances the officers were not required to 
demand entrance and announce their purpose (Pen. Code, 
§ 844), for to do so might have alerted the suspect and in-
creased the officers' peril. (See Ker v. Oalifornia, 374 U.S. 
23, 37-41 [83 8.0t. 1623, 10 L.Ed.2d 726] ; People v. Maddox, 
46 Oa1.2d 301, 305.306 [294 P.2d 6].) 
The search in the present case is thus different from the 
search condemned in Stcmer v. California, 376 U.S. 483 [84 
S.Ct. 889, 11 L.Ed.2d 56]. In that case, two days after the 
robbery of a food market, police officers identified the defend-
ant as one of the two robbers. Without a warrant, the officers 
went to the defendant's hotel where a clerk let them into Ms 
room. They had no reason to believe that the defendant was 
in his room, for his key was in his mailbox at the hotel desk. 
The officers were not in fresh pursuit of escaping robbers .. 
and they therefore had no reason to believe that the accom-
plice was in defendant's room. Moreover, they had time to 
obtain a warrant. Accordingly, there were no exigent circum. 
tances such as existed in the present case to justify the 
search. 
[19] The search in the present case was also properly 
limited to and incident to the purpose of the officers' entry. 
While the officers were looking through the apartment for 
their suspect they could properly examine suspicious objects 
in plain sight. (ReopZe v. Roberts, 47 Oal.2d 374, 378-380 
[303 P.2d 721).) Moreover, they could properly look through 
the apartment for anything that cOllJd be used to identify the 
suspects or to expedite the pursuit. AccordingJy, the ('vidence 
obtained through the search was properly admitted. 
Defendant Gilbert makes several other contentions that 
affect him only. 
:) 
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, -,...""-[20] Be contends that handwriting exemplars were o~ 
,tained from him by deceit and in the absence of counsel hi , 
violation of the principles of E8cobedo v. lUinois, 878 U.S. ' 
478 [84 S.Ct. 1758, 12 L.Ed.2d 977], and that the exemplars 
were erroneously admitted at the trial along with testimony 
based upon them by an expert who identified Gilbert's hand-
writing on the bank area drawing found in his apartment. 
Since we agree with the Attorney General's contention that 
Gilbert waived any rights that he might have had before he 
made the exemplars, we need not decide whether handwriting 
exemplars are properly within the rule of E8cobedo v. lUi-
"oil, BUpt"4. We' also agree that there is no evidence of im-
proper deception by the authorities. " .; 
F.B.I. Agent Dean arrested Gilbert in Philadelphia on'} 
February26, 1964. When Dean attempted to interrogate Gil:- :;:~: 
bert about the Alhambra bank robbery, Gilbert refused to;:~ 
talk until he obtained the advice of counsel. Later that day, 2~ 
agent Shanahan interviewed Gilbert. Shanahan told him that ';. 
he was not required to say anything without advice from an' 
attorney and that any statement he made might be used 
against him. Gilbert agreed to talk about anything except the 
California robbery. Shanahan interrogated Gilbert about rob- ~ 
beries in Philadelphia in which a demand note had been used ' 
and he asked Gilbert for a sample of his handprinting. Gilbert: 
voluntarily wrote some exemplars. Shanahan testified that he. 
obtained those exemplars for the purpose of investigating the 
Philadelphia robberies and that they were thereafter filed by \j,' 
the F.B.I. in the same manner as fingerprints. Be did not tell oj 
Gilbert that the exemplars would not be used in any other 
investigation. Thus, even if Gilbert believed that his exem-
plars would not be used in California, it does not appear that 
the authorities improperly induced such belief. 
Gilbert further contends that Escobedo requires the exclu-
sion of testimony of witnesses who identified him as one of 
the robbers after they attended a police "show-up" in which 
he appeared without counsel after indictment.' 
We rejected a similar contention in PeopZe v. Lopez, 60 
TGUbert a180 contends that he was taken from the jail to the 
"show.up" at the polil'e building without authorization in violation of 
Penal Code aeetion 4004. The pr08eeution was not required to eatabliBh 
aueb authorization a8 n found.ation for t.he testimony of witnesses who 
ident.illcd Gilbert, and we nlu~t pr1'8Ume that official duty was regularly 
performed. (Code Civ. Proe., • 1963, 8ubd. 15.) Moreover, we see DO 
compelling rea80n to adopt an exelu8ionary rule to enforce compliance 
witb .eetion '00'. 
/ 
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Oa1.2d 223, 241-244 [32 Oal.Rptr. 424, 384 P.2d 16], on the 
ground that the purpose of the right to counsel in pretrial 
stages is primarily to insure early representation and ade-
quate preparation for trial, and should not be construed to 
hinder legitimate police investigation when no substantial 
right of the accused is at stake. [21] Since the privilege 
against self-incrimination does not exempt the accused from 
appearing for the purpose of identification, no substantial 
right is infringed by the show-up. The principle of the Lope8 
case has not been impaired by Escobedo v. IUinois, 378 U.S. 
478 [84 S.Ot. 1758, 12 L.Ed.2d 977]. [22] Although re-
quiring a defendant to appear in a show-up after his indict-
ment cannot be considered a mere investigatory procedure, 
the defendant is not prejudiced by the absence of counsel so 
long as the show-up is not designed to elicit information from 
him or impair his privilege against self-incrimination. The 
defendant is required to do no more at a show-up than he 
would have to do at trial, and the prosecution may properly 
use such a procedure to select witnesses and prepare its case. 
"[A]bsent the privilege against self-incrimination or other 
privileges provided by law, the defendant in a criminal case 
has no 'Valid interest in denying the prosecution access to 
evidence that can throw light on issues in the case." (Jones 
v. Superior Court, 58 Oa1.2d 56, 59 [22 Oal.Rptr. 879, 372 
P.2d 919,96 A.L.R.2d 1213].) 
[23] Gilbert contends that counsel is necessary at the 
show-up to observe whether the proceedings are fairly con-
ducted. Oounsel can effectively obtain such information, how-
ever, by pretrial discovery of prosecution witnesses and by 
cross-examination on the issue of the procedure employed 
during the show-up. 
Gilbert contends that the trial court erroneously admitted 
into evidence testimony that he was armed with a concealed 
deadly weapon when he was arrested. We agree. 
[24] The weapon found in Gilbert's possession when he 
was arrested was not identified as the one used in the rob-
bery. (Of. People v. Biser, 47 Oa1.2d 566, 577 [305 P.2d 1]; 
Pen. Oode, § 12022.) Such evidence could therefore be prop-
erly admitted only upon the' issue of the minimum penalty. 
(Pen. Oode, §§ 3024, 969c, 1158a.) Penal Oode section 3024 
provides for increased minimum penalties when the defend-
ant has in his possession a concealed deadly weapon upon 
arrest. [25] When the defendant is so charged under sec-
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tion 969c and pleads not guilty, the jury must determine' 
whether he was armed as charged. (Pen. Code, § 1158a.) 
When the defendant is willing to stipulate to being armed at 
arrest for the purpose of the penalty, however, as in the 
present case, no purpose is served by admitting evidence that 
the defendant was so armed. (Cf. Pen. Code, § 1025.) More-
over, even if the defendant denies being armed upon arrest, 
the jury should be instructed that evidence that the defend-
ant was armed when arrested should not be considered as 
tending to prove his guilt. [26] Evidence that a weapon 
was found in the defendant's possession "tends to show, not 
that he committed the crime, but only that he is the sort of 
person who carries deadly weapons." (People v. Biser, 47 
Cal.2d 566, 577 [305 P.2d 1].) The error in admitting testi-
mony that Gilbert was armed at arrest, however, was not 
prejudicial. (CaI.Const., art. VI, § 4%.) 
[27] Gilbert contends that the trial court erred in admit-
ting evidence that he was arrested in Philadelphia, on the 
ground that the time and place of his arrest were too remote 
to prove llight. There was other more cogent evidence of 
1light, however, and Gilbert was not prejudiced by the evi- ,.' i 
dence that he was arrested in Philadelphia. 
Gilbert contends that the trial court improperly refused to 
give an alibi instruction. [28] An alibi consists of evi-' :" .. '. 
dence that the defendant was not at the scene of the crime.; 
when it was committed and did not otherwise participate in 
its commission. [29] No evidence was introduced to show ' 
that Gilbert was somewhere else at the time of the robbery. ·.·.·.1 . ' . . ·
The robbery occurred about 10 :45 a.m. on January 3, 1964. . 
King testified that it took about 45 minutes to drive from . , 
Alhambra to Gilbert's apartment. The manager of the apart~ "'~~,. 
ment house testified that Gilbert asked her for a key between ~, 
11 a.m. and 12 noon. Upon cross-examination, the manager ' 
said that she thought it was closer to 12 than to 11 when f~i 
Gilbert asked her for the key. She admitted, however, that ";1 
she previously told the F.B.I. that Gilbert asked her for a"~ 
key sometimt between 11 a.m. and 11 :30 a.m. Such evidence 
did not warrant an alibi instruction. The managE'r's ndmis-
sion upon cross-examination that her testimony varied some-
what from the statement sh~ previously gave to the F.B.I. 
did not tend to establish that Gilbert was somewhere else 
when the robbery occurred. It merely east some doubt on the 
accuracy of the manager's testimony. Aecordingly, the trial 
'" court properly refused an alibi instruction. 
1 
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[SO] . Gilbert ~ontends that the trial court committed 
prejudicial error in refusing to instruct the jury on the issue 
of kidnaping with bodily harm. Section 209 of the Penal 
Code provides that when the person kidnaped suffers bodily 
harm the penalty shall be either death or life imprisonment 
without possibility of parole. Thus, if there was evidence of 
bodily harm and the jury had been instructed thereon, it 
would not have been limited to choosing between the death 
penalty and life imprisonment, but would also have been able 
to :fix the penalty at life imprisonment without possibility of 
parole. (Of. People v. 8eiterle, 56 Oa1.2d 320 [14 Cal.Rptr. 
681, 363 P.2d 913].) 
The trial court did not err, however, in refusing to give 
Gilbert's requested instruction on bodily harm, since there 
was no evidence to support such an instruction. The victim 
testified that the grip on her arm was so firm that she "felt 
the impressions on that arm for sometime," and that she was 
pushed toward the door. Although she fell down on the side-
walk, she was not sure whether she was pushed down, and 
there was no evidence that she suffered any injuries in faU-
ing. Such trivial injury is not sufficient to constitute bodily 
harm within the meaning of section 209. In People v. Jack-
son, 44 Ca1.2d 511, 516-517 [282 P.2d 898], we held that the 
victim of a kidnaping suffered no bodily harm as a matter of 
law, although he was pushed into a sitting position on a 
couch and his wrists and ankles were chained so as to impair 
the circulation of blood and make some marks on his wrists. 
Gilbert contends, however, that "any touching of the per-
son of another against his will with physical force in an 
intentional, hostile and aggravated manner, or the projecting 
of such force against his person" constitutes bodily harm 
within the meaning of section 209. (See People v. Tanner, 3 
Oa1.2d 279, 297 [44 P.2d 324); Peoplev. Britton, 6 Ca1.2d 1, 
3 [56 P.2d 494] ; People v. Brown, 29 Oal.2d 555, 559 [176 
P.2d 929]; People v. Chessman, 38 Cal.2d 166, 185 [238 P.2d 
1001].) We rejected this definition in the Jackson case, how-
ever, and pointed out that in the Tanner case and the cases 
following it, the kidnaping victim suffered serious bodily 
injury. 
Finally, there is no merit in Gilbert's contention that the 
trial court improperly excused jurors for cause who stated 
upon voir dire examination that they would have been able 
fairly to adjudicate guilt even though they were conscien-
tiously opposed to capital punisl1ment. He asserts that SUCll 
" 
) 
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jurors should have been allowed to serve at the trial on the 
issue of guilt and a new jury impaneled if necessary for the 
trial on the issue of penalty. 
In People v. Riser, 47 Cal.2d 566, 573-576 [305 P.2d 1], we . 
held that it is improper to permit such jurors to serve even 
though their exclusion is not compelled by a literal reading 
of Penal Code section 1074, subdivision S.8 [31] Moreover, 
after our decision in the Riser case, the Legislature adopted 
section 190.1, which provides for a separate penalty trial and 
states that at the trial on the issue of penalty "the trier of 
fact shall be the same jury [as on the issue of guilt] unless, 
for good cause shown, the court discharges the jury . . . ." 
(Italics added.) Thus, in providing for a separate penalty 
trial, the Legislature expressed a preference for one jury 
qualified to act throughout the entire case. 
Such legislative preference for the same jury at both trials 
deprives the defendant neither of due process nor of the 
right to an impartial jury. Since all of the evidence properly 
introduced at the trial on the issue of guilt is relevant in 
determining the penalty (Pen. Code, § 190.1), having the 
same jury avoids repetition of evidence and is thus not an 
arbitrary requirement. [32] To exclude jurors opposed to 
the death penalty does not favor the prosecution over the 
defendant, for the defendant has the right to challenge for 
cause jurors who have a bias in favor of the death penalty 
even though they state that they are able to render an impar-
tial verdict of guilt. (See People v. Riser, 47 Ca1.2d 566, 575 
[305 P.2d 1].) 
The judgment as to King is reversed. The judgment as to 
Gilbert on count II is reversed. In all other respects the 
judgments as to Gilbert are affirmed. 
Peters, J., Tobriner, J., Peek, J., and Burke, J., con-
curred. 
MOSK, J.-I concur in affirming the judgments as to Gil-
bert and I concur in the reversal of count II as to both 
defendants under compulsion of People v. Washington 
(1965) 62 Ca1.2d 777 [44 CalRptr. 442, 402 P.2d 130]. I 
8Section 1074, subdivision 8, provides that: "A cballenge for implied 
bias may be taken for all or any of the following causes, and for JlO 
other. • • • 8. If the offense charged be punishable with death, the 
entertaining of such conscientious opinions as would preclude hiB ji:n.di"'l1 
'he defeMant guilty • ••• " (Italics added.) 
) 
) 
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dissent, however, from the reversal of the other judgments as 
to King. 
'On the ladder of culpability, King was undeniably several 
rungs below his codefendant Gilbert. This factor was con-
sidered by the jury in sparing his life while returning a 
verdict of death for Gilbert. However, neither a distinction 
between the extent of involvement of the two defendants nor 
the facts of this case justify reversing King's conviction. 
Viewed in the light most favorable to the People, as it 
must be (PeopZe v. Sweeney (1960) 55 Ca1.2d 27, 33 [9 Cal. 
Rptr. 793, 357 P.2d 1049]), the evidence does not support the 
view of the majority that the incriminating statements of 
King were obtained when "the authorities had carried out a 
process of interrogations that lent itself to eliciting incrimi-
nating statements" (Escobedo v. Illinois (1964) 378 U.S. 
478 [84 RCt. 1758, 12 L.Ed.2d 977]; PeopZe v. Dorado 
(1965) 62 Cal.2d 338, 353 [42 Cal.Rptr. 169, 398 P.2d 
361]). 
The prosecution attempted to introduce into evidence 
statements made by both defendants. After extensive voir 
dire examination outside the presence of the jury, the trial 
judge thoughtfully reviewed the facts and the relevant law 
on confessions. Gilbert's extrajudicial statements were ex-
cluded. As to King, however, the court made a specific oral 
finding: "I think the record is straight. The Court has heard 
the evidence in this case and is of the opinion that this 
defendant did not request counsel; that he had no desire to 
have counsel at the time. That the first time that he knew· 
that he became suspect in this case it was his desire to make a 
complete confession of his involvement in this offense, on his 
own volition, and that whatever statement he made, from 
evidence I heard, was completely voluntary on his part. . • • 
I am not yet prepared to say that a defendant that wants to 
'spill his guts,' if I may use that term, and make a complete 
confession of a crime, that he cannot be permitted to do so 
unless whoever is questioning him goes out and gets him a 
lawYer." 
Under well-settled rules of law, we are bound by the deter-
mination of the trial judge on questions of fact. The trial 
court found Dot merely that King did not ask for counsel, 
but that he had no desire to have counsel at the time of his 
confession. The evidence amply. supports that conclusion. 
The majority opinion refers to "a period of prolonged 
interrogation" after arrest and during the accusatory stage 
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as defined in Dorado. That description is superficiallY8c~ : 
curate, but it overlooks the' significant backdrop to this -
drama. 
The tragic crime involved here was committed on January ". 
3, 1964. From January 5 on, King knew that he was a 8U8-
pect, and indeed he had been interviewed by the police three 
times. He had more than a month in which to obtain advice 
of counsel if he had so desired and having su1Iered two prior 
convictions of a felony, he could not have been unaware of 
the need for and the right to legal representation. Instead, . 
however, he brooded about making a clean breast of his ' 
involvement, and in fact on one occasion he started for the i 
police station with that in mind but lost his nerve en route. 
This background makes completely comprehensible his subse-
quent conduct when, on February 11, he was brought from 
San Gabriel, where he was in custody on another matter" to 
the Alhambra police department, where he was placed under 
arrest on these charges and a process of booking began. Dur-
ing that process King asked Officer Ted Bennett what 
charges he faced, and the officer responded that he was being 
booked for two counts of murder, one count of robbery, and 
one count of kidnaping. Thereupon King became voluble and 
freely discussed his participation in the events involved herein. 
Officer Bennett did not undertake a process of interrogation, 
but on the contrary tried to discourage King from talking 
and instructed him to wait until later, for his conversation 
was interrupting the booking procedure. Nevertheless, King 
persisted and continued to discuss the case. The dialogue 
related in the footnote summarizes the event.1 
IOn voir dire examination at the trial, 01lieer Bennett made it abun-
dantly clear that King'l statements were voluntary and entirely un· 
solicited. In response to questions from the court. the officer testified 
&I follows: 
., TBB CollltT: You first took him to the booking officer that h&l charge 
of the booking, did you' 
IITlB WITNESS: Yes, sir. 
HTJu: CollltT: With reference to )Oour taking him there, when did he 
Itart to talk about thie cue' 
IITlB WITNESS: As he was taken to the booking window, he asked 
what the cha#ges were. I related the charges, and at that time he started 
relating his participation in it. 
" THE CollltT: Did you make lome statement to him at that time about 
continuing with telling you aboue it until a later time or what! 
1ITJu: WITNESS: I asked him on several oeeuions, sir, not to relate 
it at that time, to wait until after he '11'&1 booked, but he continued on. 
IITBB OOllltT: Now, were you there during the process of the booking' 
"THE WITNESS: Yes, sir. 
"To OOllltT: And during all the time that he was being-the in· 
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The majority emphasizes that the statements introduced in 
evidence were not those made by King during the booking 
process but were those elicited during the subsequent period 
in the interrogation room. I do not consider this to be a 
signi1icant distinction, for during this entire period King 
sought to relate his story and, indeed, could not be deterred 
from doing so. It is understandable that King would choose 
to volunteer statements regarding his participation in the 
crimes, since it was his purpose to cast the blame entirely on 
his codefendant Gilbert.2 He undoubtedly considered it to 
his advantage to relate his version of events before his co-
defendant talked. That he was so inclined is indicated not 
only by his conduct during the booking procedure but by his 
earlier start for the police station to confess, frustrated only 
by his loss of nerve. He stated several times that he could not 
sleep because he was troubled by his conscience, that he 
•• wanted to see this guy [Gilbert] busted as much as you." 
After several hours in the interrogation room, during 
which King related his version of events, he was asked to 
prepare a statement and sign it. He recited his story volun-
tarily and without interruption or interrogation. In fact, one 
witness described him as being as resolute as if he were 
dictating a novel. I 
The tirst time the evidence suggests any reluctance by 
King to continue his volunteered narration was his declina-
tion to sign the dictated statement. He then added an 
formation was being taken by the booking officer, was be making st.ate· 
ments wit.h reference to this casef 
"THE WITNESS: Yes, sir, he was. 
"THE COURT: And this started as soon as you told him what he was 
going to be charged with, is that right! 
•• THE WITNESS: Yes. 
"THE COURT: All right. Did be continue making this statement during 
the booking process' 
"THE WITNESS: All through the process, sir." 
'The eagerness of King to talk was deemed significant by lIis own 
cOUDsel, who stressed it in closing a.rgument to the jury: "You can a.lso 
take into consideration the fact that after Mr. King's arrest lIe did try 
in all ways that h/1 could to assist the Alhambra police. Now, maybe this 
assistance came late; maybe Mr. King was interested in self·preservation 
and wanted to keep from being tied into these particular offenses. But 
then be did cooperate, and I think that cooperation with the police indi-
cates the possibility of rehabilitation as far as Mr. King is eoncerned." 
IThe fol\owmg colloquy was from the testimony of the witness 
Luciano: 
"Q. There were no instructiops at all during this dictated statement! 
"A. No interruptions whatsoever. He sat down lind dictated like be 
W8.1 writing a Dovel.'· 
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appendage reading as follows: "I make this statement freely' 
of my own will, however not being familiar with the laws I 
do not feel that lahould sign this confession or make any . 
tape recordings of the sattle until I have been advised to do 80 
or not by an attorney. The omcers involved did inform. me 
prior to making this statement that it could and possibly 
would be used in court against me. " '\', 
At the trial, King asserted he had expressed a desire to 
phone his girl friend to request her to obtain counsel for him. 
But· on cross-examination he admitted that ahe would have 
been unavailable during working hours. Furthermore, King 
admitted to a witness outside the courtroom during prelimi- \ 
nary proceedings that he had not asked for a phone call to ., 
contact an attorney, but had read of a recent Supreme Oourt 
decision in the newspaper about asking for an attorney, and 
"you can't blame a guy for trying." In any event, we are 
bound by the factual determination of the trial court that he 
neither sought nor desired counsel during this period. J 
The majority, by reversing King's conviction merely be-
cause Dorado ritual was not recited, apply a parochial 
approach to a relatively uncomplicated factual situation. The 
police officers could not have given legal advice to King 
before he blurted out his incriminating statements at the 
booking office; it is evident that efforts to deter his narration 
were unavailing. And it is wholly unrealistic, as well as 
futile, to require the police to advise a suspect of his right to 
counsel after he, of his own volition and without urging or 
prompting, takes the initiative to confess. It appears to be of 
little consequence that in the instant case King's unsolicited 
confession began during the booking process and continued 
in an interrogation room. The total circumstances are not as 
neatly divisible as the majority opinion chooses to make 
them. People v. Jacobson (1965) ante, p. 819 [46 Cal.Rptr. 
515,405 P.2d 555], and People v. Cotter (1965) 6nte, p. 886 
[46 Cal.Rptr. 622, 405 P.2d 862]. two cases involving mUltiple 
confessions cited by the majority, are inapposite. In both 
cases the defendants confessed several times during the inves-
tigatory stage, Jater were brought to the police station where 
they were interrogated and again confessed. The earlier and 
Jater events were clearly distinct as to time, location and 
circums\ances. Here, King's incriminatory statement resulted 
from one continuous process, all of it the product of his con-
trite frame of mind. Th~ record is utterly devoid of evidence 
luggesting he was imposed UpOD, coerced, persuaded or in-
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duced to relate his criminal experience in any manner other 
than his uninhibited inclination dictated. 
The evidence, including King's statement, amply supports 
his conviction. Therefore, except as to eountlI,I would 
a1Hrm the King judgments. . 
McComb, J., concurred. 
The petition of appellant Gilbt\rtfor arebearing was de-
nied February 9, 1966. . 
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